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Actor Preference and the Implementation of INS v. 
Chadha 
 
Darren A. Wheeler* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The initial uproar over the Supreme Court‘s decision to invalidate 
the legislative veto in INS v. Chadha was deafening. Many feared that 
such a decision would wreak havoc on the public policymaking process 
but these fears never came to pass. In many cases Congress ignored the 
Court and continued to pass legislative vetoes. The executive branch, 
while often offering token objections, also continued to work as though 
the legislative veto was still part of the policymaking process. Why did 
these actors responsible for implementing the Court‘s decision in this 
case fail to fully and faithfully do so? This article argues that both 
congressional and executive branch actors had their own preferences that 
overrode their motivation to implement the Court‘s decision. As a result, 
these actors largely ignored the Court‘s mandate. By examining this 
compliance failure in the context of the Chadha case it is possible to 
explore the inter-branch dynamics that can be involved in the 
implementation of a Supreme Court decision that directly affects the 
other two branches of government. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
On June 23, 1983 the Supreme Court struck down the legislative 
veto by a 7-2 margin in the case of Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) v. Chadha.
1
 Reaction to the Court‘s decision was swift. 
Some members of Congress called the decision ―statute shattering,‖ and 
many scholars believed that Chadha would be a substantial blow to 
congressional oversight power.
2
 Congressional unhappiness with the 
Court‘s decision in Chadha was clearly evident from the outset. 
Michigan Senator Carl Levin was quoted as saying: ―This decision is 
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 1. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 2. Darren Wheeler, Implementing INS v. Chadha: Communication Breakdown?, 52 WAYNE 
L. REV. 1185, 1186 (2006). 
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going to cause a lot of conflict and chaos.‖3 Unhappy at the thought that 
Congress had lost a valuable oversight tool, die-hard veto proponent 
Representative Elliott Levitas asserted that Congress would put the 
Administration on a very short leash.
4
 
Even the justices themselves appeared to appreciate the potential 
gravity of their decision. When later queried about the 1982-1983 term, 
Chief Justice Burger responded that Chadha was the most important case 
the Court decided ―especially in the long run . . . Chadha is certainly 
among one of the fifty most important cases in our history.‖5 
Despite the Supreme Court‘s decision, Congress continued to include 
legislative vetoes in statutes.
6
 In the first sixteen months immediately 
following Chadha Congress added an additional fifty-three legislative 
vetoes.
7
 Over two hundred more were added through 1993.
8
 One 
commentator dryly noted that ―Chadha may prove to be as effective in 
limiting legislative vetoes as the Eighteenth Amendment was in limiting 
the consumption of alcohol.‖9 
By the time the Court announced its decision in Chadha, the 
legislative veto had become a popular oversight tool incorporated into 
hundreds of statutes by Congress as an oversight measure.
10
 The Court‘s 
invalidation of this tool threatened not only these statutes but also 
threatened to disrupt the policymaking relationships between Congress 
and executive branch agencies.
11
 However, Chadha did not turn out to be 
as devastating as many had feared.
12
 This was due in part to the fact that 
Congress and executive agencies were somewhat reluctant to implement 
the Supreme Court‘s decision. This article explores why executive and 
legislative branch officials fail to faithfully and fully implement the 
Chadha decision. 
 
 3. Supreme Court Decision That Stunned Congress, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 4, 
1983, at 14 [hereinafter Stunned Congress]. 
 4. Sharp Shifts in Congress Practices and Legislative Conflict Predicted, N.Y. TIMES, June, 
24 1983, at A1 [hereinafter Sharp Shifts]. 
 5. BARBARA H. CRAIG, CHADHA: THE STORY OF AN EPIC CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE 232 
n.27 (Oxford Univ. Press 1988). 
 6. Louis Fisher, Judicial Misjudgments About the Lawmaking Process: The Legislative Veto 
Case, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 705, 706 (1985). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., 273, 273 (1993). 
 9. MICHAEL MEZEY, CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND PUBLIC POLICY 170 (Westview 
Press 1989). 
 10. William West & Joseph Cooper, The Congressional Veto and Administrative 
Rulemaking, 98 POL. SCI. Q. 285, 286 (1983). 
 11. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 1002 (1983). 
 12. Wheeler, supra note 2. 
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Even if courts clearly articulate a decision, there are still a number of 
other variables that can affect the implementation of that decision.
13
 
Many political and legal scholars argue that the preferences of those 
responsible for implementing a judicial decision are a key element of the 
overall implementation picture.
14
 The Chadha case provides a good 
example of a case where many of those responsible for the 
implementation of the decision clearly did not agree with the Court.
15
 
This article explores the hypothesis that executive and legislative 
officials had their own preferences that overrode their motivation to fully 
and faithfully implement the Court‘s decision. In other words, actors 
responsible for implementing a judicial decision often have other 
preferences that influence their behavior aside from the Court‘s 
directions, preferences that may override any interest they would have in 
fully implementing the Court‘s decisions. 
Part I of this article introduces the subject and the research question. 
Part II will briefly outline the history and use of the legislative veto. This 
will provide context for the Supreme Court‘s Chadha decision. Part III 
will review the judicial implementation literature that focuses on 
organization approaches to the implementation of judicial decisions. Part 
IV will focus on the Chadha decision itself in order to see just what it 
was that Congress and the executive branch had to work with in the wake 
of Chadha. The reactions of both executive branch officials and 
Congress will then be reviewed in Parts V and VI. What actions were 
taken and what reasoning was given for them? Did these actors articulate 
conflicting preferences that affected their ability and willingness to 
implement the Chadha decision? In Part VII, a brief case study, The 
Treasury Act of 1992, will illustrate how congressional and executive 
preferences shaped policymaking in a post-Chadha national government. 
 
 
 
 
 13. See, e.g.,BRADLEY CANON & CHARLES JOHNSON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION 
AND IMPACT (CQ Press 1999). 
 14. See, e.g., CANON & JOHNSON, supra note 13; BEN M. CROUCH & JAMES W. MARQUART, 
AN APPEAL TO JUSTICE: LITIGATED REFORM IN TEXAS PRISONS, (Univ. of Texas Press 1989); 
GEORGE EDWARDS, III, IMPLEMENTING PUBLIC POLICY (CQ Press 1980); STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE 
IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES (Dorsey Press 1970); 
Lawrence Baum, Implementation of Judicial Decisions, 4 AM. POL. Q. 86 (1976); James Spriggs, 
Explaining Federal Bureaucratic Compliance with Supreme Court Opinions, 50 POL. RES. Q. 567 
(1997) [hereinafter Federal Bureaucratic Compliance]; James Spriggs, The Supreme Court and 
Federal Administrative Agencies: A Resource-Based Theory and Analysis of Judicial Impact, 40 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 1122 (1996) [hereinafter Supreme Court]; Donald Van Meter & Carl E. Van Horn, 
The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework, 6 ADMIN. & SOC‘Y 445 (1975). 
 15. See Stunned Congress, supra note 3; Sharp Shifts, supra note 4. 
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II.  THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 
 
The legislative veto is essentially a generic name for a number of 
different types of actions designed to provide a measure of congressional 
control over the manner in which the executive branch implements a 
statute.
16
 While a legislative veto can take a variety of forms, it is 
―essentially . . . a clause in a statute, which says that a particular 
executive action . . . will take effect only if congress does not nullify it 
by resolution within a specific period of time.‖17 Through legislative veto 
provisions in statutes ―Congress simultaneously reserved the power to 
block specific exercises of this authority by passage of resolutions which 
were not submitted for presidential review.‖18 
The legislative veto was originally employed during the Hoover 
Administration.
19
 At that point in time, it was primarily used for 
executive branch reorganization.
20
 Prior to this, Congress had to pass 
legislation authorizing any executive reorganization.
21
 As time passed, 
Congress discovered additional uses for this new oversight tool. By the 
time Chadha was decided in the mid-1980s, the legislative veto was a 
part of over two hundred statutes.
22
 These statutes included over three 
hundred separate veto provisions.
23
 The Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Act of 1974 and the War Powers Act of 1973 are but two 
of the more prominent acts that contained legislative vetoes.
24
 The 
legislative veto became such a popular oversight tool that vetoes became 
boilerplate language added to hundreds of statutes without really much 
thought about how such provisions would affect the implementation of 
the statutes in question.
25
 As a result of this proliferation in the use of the 
legislative veto, it was no small matter when the Supreme Court decided 
to rule on the constitutionality of the legislative veto in Chadha. 
 
 
 
 16. See CRAIG, supra note 5. 
 17. Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEO. L. J. 785, 785 (1984). 
 18. Michael J. Horan, Of Train Wrecks, Time Bombs, and Skinned Cats: The Congressional 
Response to the Fall of the Legislative Veto, 13 J. LEGIS. 22, 22 (1986). 
 19. BARBARA H. CRAIG, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO: CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF 
REGULATION 16 (Westview Press 1983). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. West & Cooper, supra note 10. 
 23. Id. 
 24. For a partial list of statutes containing legislative vetoes see the attached appendix to 
Justice White‘s dissenting opinion in INS v. Chadha 462 U.S. 919,1003–13 (1983) (White, J., 
dissenting). 
 25. Wheeler, supra note 2, at 1189. 
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III.  ACTOR PREFERENCE AND JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Compliance with judicial decisions is not something that can be 
taken for granted any more than a supervisor can assume that her 
instructions will be followed to the letter or a district office will follow 
the directives of the home office without fail. The Framers of the 
Constitution recognized this potential problem. In Federalist #78, 
Alexander Hamilton argued that the judicial branch of government was 
―beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power . . . .  
It may truly be said to have neither force nor will but merely judgment; 
and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for 
the efficacy of its judgments.‖26 Courts must rely on others to implement 
their decisions. This can be problematic when a judicial decision is 
unpopular as evidenced historically by the furor surrounding 
controversial Supreme Court decisions such as those involving school 
prayer and school desegregation.
27
 This section will review the various 
organizational approaches that have been employed in the judicial 
implementation literature. These approaches will examine the 
relationships between higher and lower courts, courts and executive 
agencies, and courts and Congress in the context of judicial 
implementation. 
Organizational approaches to the analysis of the implementation and 
impact of judicial decisions are ―based on the idea that although it is 
individuals who make acceptance and compliance decisions, they often 
do so in the context of organization goals and policies.‖28 Research in 
this area has focused on a variety of organizational factors such as cost, 
organization structure/location,
29
 and factors external to the 
organization.
30
 Additionally, individual factors such as how officials 
understand the decision, the cost of compliance, agreement with the 
decision, the obligation to comply, and the official‘s personal interests 
have all been explored as variables that affect the implementation of 
 
 26. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465–66 (Alexander Hamilton) (Penguin Books 1961). 
 27. See, e.g., KENNETH DOLBEARE & PHILLIP HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS 
(Univ. of Chicago Press 1971); RICHARD JOHNSON, THE DYNAMICS OF COMPLIANCE: SUPREME 
COURT DECISION–MAKING FROM A NEW PERSPECTIVE (Northwestern Univ. Press 1967); WILLIAM 
MUIR JR., PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (Univ. of Chicago Press 1967); J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-
EIGHT LONELY MEN (Univ. of Illinois Press 1971); Michael W. Giles & Douglas S. Gatlin, Mass 
Compliance with Public Policy: The Case of School Desegregation, 42 J. POL. 722 (1980); Michael 
W. Giles & Thomas G. Walker, Judicial Policy-Making and Southern School Desegregation, 37 J. 
POL. 917 (1975). 
 28. CANON & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 173. 
 29. See STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (4th ed., 
Nelson–Hall 1993). 
 30. Van Meter & Van Horn, supra note 14, at 525. 
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judicial decisions.
31
 Two areas that have historically received the most 
attention of judicial scholars are the organizational relationship between 
the Supreme Court and lower courts,
32
 and the relationship between 
courts and bureaucratic agencies.
33
 
 
A.  Relationships Between Higher and Lower Courts 
 
Judicial scholars examining the relationship between the Supreme 
Court and lower courts have often concluded that lower courts are 
constrained to some degree by Supreme Court decisions and feel 
compelled, for a variety of reasons, to abide by these decisions. Specific 
organizational approaches have included tension,
34
 bureaucratic inertia,
35
 
and principal-agent models.
36
 The general approach revolves around the 
idea that the hierarchy of courts is similar to bureaucratic hierarchies in 
that the decisions of the higher element affect the lower elements.
37
 To 
the degree that this is correct, it may mean that the implementation of 
judicial decisions is similar to that of the implementation of policies 
within bureaucracies more generally and that there is some value in 
looking at possible linkages between the two.
38
 
If lower court judges do feel somewhat constrained by higher court 
decisions, why might this be the case? Organization theorists often focus 
on the sense of professionalism that the vast majority of lower court 
judges have.
39
 This sense of professionalism usually guides the judicial 
decision-making process rather than personal predilections about certain 
decisions with which they disagree.
40
 It also helps to maintain the 
integrity of the judicial system.
41
 No lower court judge likes to have 
 
 31. Baum, supra note 14, at 97; Van Meter & Van Horn, supra note 14, at 472; see also 
WASBY, supra note 29. 
 32. See CROUCH & MARQUART, supra note 14; Lauren Bowen, Attorney Advertising in the 
Wake of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona (1977): A Study of Judicial Impact, 23 AM. POL. Q. 461 
(1995); Charles A. Johnson, Judicial Decisions and Organization Change: Some Theoretical and 
Empirical Notes on State Court Decisions and State Administrative Agencies, 14 L. & SOC‘Y REV. 
27 (1979); Donald Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of 
Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673 (1994). 
 33. See CROUCH & MARQUART, supra note 14; Supreme Court, supra note 14; Federal 
Bureaucratic Compliance, supra note 14. 
 34. See Johnson, supra note 32. 
 35. See Songer et al., supra note 32; CROUCH & MARQUART, supra note 14; Bowen, supra 
note 32. 
 36. See Songer et al., supra note 32. 
 37. Baum, supra note 14, at 87–89. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Baum, supra note 14, at 101. 
 40. CANON & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 38. 
 41. Id. at 37–39; see also Songer et al., supra note 32 (discussing a study using a Principal-
Agent Model to reach similar conclusions). 
 83] ACTOR PREFERENCE AND THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 89 
decisions reversed by higher courts and several scholars have concluded 
that there is evidence to support the contention that the authority of 
higher courts is unusually strong in judicial organizations.
42
 
In reality, higher courts have very few tools at their disposal when it 
comes to sanctioning lower courts and judges.
43
 It is persuasion, often via 
opinions,
44
 that higher courts usually use in their efforts to keep lower 
courts in line.
45
 This relative freedom is largely due to the insulation that 
most judges enjoy. Federal judges are subject to very few external 
sanctions.
46
 This gives them an exceptional amount of leeway in the 
performance of their duties, enough to lead some judicial scholars to 
maintain that influence is a two-way street between upper and lower 
courts.
47
 
Despite these pressures to acquiesce to Supreme Court decisions, 
political scientist Lawrence Baum argues that judicial policy preferences 
can result in non-compliance with higher court decisions.
48
 Baum 
contends that there is no reason to assume that policy preferences by 
those in the judicial system should differ radically from actors in other 
organizations.
49
 Judges may hold strong opinions or policy preferences 
like any other organizational actor; such strong opinions may lead lower 
court judges to defy higher court rulings.
50
 There is some evidence to 
support this contention.
51
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 42. Baum, supra note 14, at 101; Songer et al., supra note 32, at 777–91. For a good 
discussion of the ―upper court myth‖ see also JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND 
REALITY IN THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM (Princeton Univ. Press 1950). Others argue that lower 
courts do have some influence of higher courts. See, e.g., Walter Murphy, Lower Court Checks on 
Supreme Court Power, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1017 (1959). 
 43. Baum, supra note 14, at 105. 
 44. Id. at 95. 
 45. Id. at 105–07. 
 46. Id. at 105. 
 47. Traciel V. Reid, Judicial Policy-Making and Implementation: An Empirical Examination, 
41 W. POL. Q. 509 (1988). 
 48. Lawrence Baum, Lower Court Responses to Supreme Court Decisions: Reconsidering a 
Negative Picture, 3 JUST. SYS. J. 208, 215 (1978); see also Baum, supra note 14, at 101. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 100. 
 51. Lawrence Baum, Specialization and Authority Acceptance: The Supreme Court and 
Lower Federal Courts, 47 POL. RES. Q. 693 (1994). 
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B.  Relationships Between Courts and Executive Agencies 
 
A handful of scholars have studied the relationship between courts 
and administrative agencies in the context of implementing judicial 
decisions.
52
 It is the duty of the legislative branch to pass laws and the 
job of the executive branch of government, often via executive agencies, 
to carry out those laws. Executive branch agencies often do this with a 
great deal of discretion.
53
 Often it is the courts that determine when 
executive branch agencies have abused this discretion.
54
 When courts 
rule on statutory or constitutional matters relating to executive agency 
actions, these agencies are expected to comply.
55
 
Although one might initially think that agencies automatically 
comply with court decisions, Martin Shapiro warns that ―the student of 
judicial-administrative politics must be prepared for a world of mutual 
influences rather than sovereign commands.‖56 Shapiro notes that courts 
typically allow agencies to do as they please and that when they do act 
they are only one political actor among many.
57
 Furthermore, while 
courts and agencies influence each other, they rarely press their claims in 
an effort to force confrontation. James Spriggs argues that general 
absence of executive agency defiance of Supreme Court decisions is a 
result of the highly interdependent relationship between the two.
58
 These 
actors must deal with each other on a repeated basis, so it is in the 
interest of both to maintain a non-confrontational relationship.
59
 Because 
of this desire for inter-branch comity, the study of the relationship 
between courts and administrative agencies is mostly a study of marginal 
cases.
60
 
Despite this generally non-confrontational relationship, tension can 
result when court opinions run contrary to an agency‘s mission or 
goals.
61
 As early as 1970, Stephen Wasby hypothesized that 
―[c]ompliance is more a function of norms in affected organizations than 
it is of Supreme Court rulings.‖62 Agency goals and preferences can 
 
 52. See CROUCH & MARQUART, supra note 14; Supreme Court, supra note 14; Federal 
Bureaucratic Compliance, supra note 14. 
 53. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. MARTIN M. SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 271 
(MacMillan 1968). 
 57. Id. at 265. 
 58. Federal Beuracratic Compliance, supra note 14, at 567. 
 59. Id. 
 60. SHAPIRO, supra note 55, at 265–68. 
 61. CANON & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 82. 
 62. WASBY, supra note 14, at 257. 
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color responses to judicial decisions.
63
 When an agency is committed to 
certain defined goals and preferences and is faced with a judicial 
decision instructing it to go against these preferences, tension results.
64
 
James Spriggs found support for the proposition that agency preferences 
affect executive agency compliance with Court decisions in his analysis 
of Supreme Court opinions that reversed or remanded a federal agency 
decision from 1953–1990.65 
Agency norms, especially the preferences of agency actors 
responsible for implementing judicial policies, can be a vital aspect of 
successful policy implementation.
66
 There are three elements that can 
affect the disposition of the implementing populations. First, those 
responsible for implementing a judicial policy must understand what it is 
they are supposed to do.
67
 Second, their immediate acceptance or 
rejection of the court‘s decision is vital.68 Finally, the intensity of the 
response is an important factor.
69
 Sometimes judicial decisions may fall 
within a ―zone of indifference‖ and will be implemented simply because 
no one feels very strongly about them.
70
 Many scholars contend, 
however, that ―barring other constraints or pressures, groups that support 
a judicial policy will implement the policy faithfully; those that do not 
will either ignore it or resist its implementation, wherever and whenever 
possible.‖71 Agency actors must have a desire to implement the judicial 
decision. Something must motivate them. If there are psychological 
and/or material costs associated with changing policies in response to a 
judicial decision without specific direction, officials will often adopt 
policies that benefit them or ignore a court decision altogether.
72
 
This article draws on the research that explores the implementation 
of judicial decisions by executive agencies but it also goes one step 
further. The inter-branch relationship between the judiciary and Congress 
 
 63. CANON & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 82. 
 64. WASBY, supra note 14, at 173–74. 
 65. See Supreme Court, supra note 14. 
 66. CANON & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 82. 
 67. Van Meter & Van Horn, supra note 14, at 472–73. 
 68. Id. at 473. 
 69. Id. 
 70. EDWARDS, supra note 14, at 90. 
 71. CANON & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 82; see also DOLBEARE & HAMMOND, supra note 
26; EDWARDS, supra note 14; PELTASON, supra note 27; WASBY, supra note15; Baum, supra note 
14; Federal Bureaucratic Compliance, supra note 14; Supreme Court, supra note 14; Van Meter & 
Van Horn, supra note 14. 
 72. CANON & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 69; Lawrence Baum, Implementing Judicial 
Decisions: An Organizational Perspective, 4 AM. POL. Q. 1, 86 (1980); see also PELTASON, supra 
note 27. This is also evident in many of the school prayer impact studies. See e.g., CROUCH & 
MARQUART, supra note 14, at 235; DOLBEARE & HAMMOND, supra note 27; JOHNSON, supra note 
27; MUIR, supra note 26; Johnson, supra note 32, at 27–29. 
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is also central to an examination of the implementation of the Chadha 
decision.  
Despite the trail of notable confrontations, only a small percentage of 
court decisions ever receive widespread negative attention from 
Congress.
73
 As is often the case though, it is the exceptions to this 
general rule that have historically received the most scholarly attention.
74
 
 
C.  Relationships Between Courts and Congress 
 
As early as the 1960s, scholars sought to stress the differences 
between ―anti-court‖ reactions and ―anti-decision‖ reactions.75 Anti-court 
reactions, those aimed at changing the size of the Court or changing its 
jurisdiction, are relatively rare while anti-decision reactions are much 
more common.
76
 William Eskridge found that each Congress since 1975, 
on average, has enacted legislation to modify or overturn roughly a 
dozen Supreme Court decisions dealing with the interpretations of 
statutes.
77
 Despite this activity, Harry Stumpf notes that hostile 
congressional reaction usually occurs in response to constitutional 
rulings by the courts as opposed to statutory rulings.
78
 This may be 
because statutory rulings can be overturned, or clarified, with less 
conflict than is often engendered in attempting to pass a constitutional 
amendment in response to a court decision.
79
 Several scholars contend 
that the congressional game in anti-court legislation is ―largely bluff, 
huff and puff‖80 or merely an exercise in ―position-taking.‖81 
 
 73. HARRY STUMPF, AMERICAN JUDICIAL POLITICS, 416 (2d ed. Prentice Hall 1998); 
WASBY, supra note 14, at 203. 
 74. See WALTER MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT (Univ. of Chicago Press 1962); C. 
HERMAN PRITCHETT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT 1957–1960 (Univ. of Minnesota 
Press 1961); STUMPF, supra note 73; WASBY, supra note 14; Joseph Ignagni & James Meernik, 
Explaining Congressional Attempts to Reverse Supreme Court Decisions, 47 POL. RES. Q. 353 
(1994); Richard A. Paschal, The Continuing Colloquy: Congress and the Finality of the Supreme 
Court, 8 J. L. & POL. 143 (1991); Harry Stumpf, Congressional Response to Supreme Court Rulings: 
The Interaction of Law and Politics, 14 J. PUB. L. 377 (1965).. 
 75. STUMPF, supra note 73, at 416–19. 
 76. Id. 
 77. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 
101 YALE L. J. 331, 335 (1991). 
 78. STUMPF, supra note 73, at 419. 
 79. Constitutional amendments aimed at overturning Supreme Court decisions are relatively 
rare but they do occur. For examples, see the histories surrounding Amendments Eleven, Fourteen, 
Sixteen, and Twenty-Six. This tactic was also attempted in response to the Chadha decision without 
success. See e.g., CRAIG, supra note 19. 
 80. STUMPF, supra note 73, at 425. 
 81. Paschal, supra note 74, at 202. And for a detailed discussion of congressional ―position-
taking‖ see DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (Yale Univ. Press 1974). 
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Some researchers also note that these negative responses to court 
decisions appear to come in ―waves or crisis periods‖ and usually 
involve a wide range of congressional participants.
82
 Others argue that 
electoral considerations sometimes play a key role in the decisions of 
members to actively oppose Supreme Court decisions.
83
 Several of these 
factors were likely at work in the Chadha case. Many considered the rise 
of the regulatory state in the late 1970s to indeed be a crisis, and the 
response to Chadha was certainly not isolated to a few members of 
Congress.
84
 Some argued that the legislative veto was a powerful 
symbolic tool for congressional members, one that they could point to as 
a means to control the federal bureaucracy.
85
 Such rhetoric would 
certainly resonate for incumbents in congressional elections. 
Political scientist Richard Paschal writes that there are three basic 
ways for Congress to limit a Supreme Court decision without directly 
addressing the policy at issue in the decision: First, Congress can opt not 
to appropriate the money necessary to enact the decision.
86
 Second, 
Congress can choose not to implement (or just partially implement) the 
decision.
87
 Finally, Congress can just refuse to comply.
88
 The final two 
options were certainly employed by Congress to varying degrees in 
response to the Court‘s Chadha decision.89 
As this brief review has revealed, a number of scholars have 
examined the organizational factors that affect the implementation of 
judicial decisions. This article will build on the work related to the 
implementation of judicial decisions by administrative agencies by 
examining the executive branch response to the Court‘s Chadha 
decision. Did they express preferences that prevented them from 
faithfully implementing the Court‘s decision? At the same time, we will 
review congressional responses as well. As a result, this research 
broadens the scope of the literature by examining a new case and at the 
same time exploring the inter-branch dynamics associated with the 
preferences of both executive and legislative officials responsible for 
implementing the Court‘s decision. 
 
 82. STUMPF, supra note 73, at 419. 
 83. Ignagni & Meernik, supra note 74. 
 84. See CRAIG, supra note 19; MARTHA LIEBLER GIBSON, WEAPONS OF INFLUENCE: THE 
LEGISLATIVE VETO, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE IRONY OF REFORM 39 (Westview Press 
1992); JESSICA KORN, THE POWER OF SEPARATION 34 (Princeton Univ. Press 1996). 
 85. Jessica Korn, The Legislative Veto and the Limits of Public Choice Analysis, 109 POL. 
SCI. Q. 873, 892 (1994). 
 86. Paschal, supra note 74, at 198 n.202. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Wheeler, supra note 2. 
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IV.  THE SUPREME COURT‘S INS V. CHADHA DECISION 
 
A.  Background 
 
As is seemingly common in constitutional law, landmark cases often 
emerge from events that seemed minor at their inception.
90
 Jagdish 
Chadha was lawfully admitted to the United States on a non-immigrant 
student visa in 1966.
91
 Chadha‘s visa expired in 1972 and less than one 
year later the District Director for INS filed an Order to Show Cause why 
he should not be deported from the United States.
92
 At the 1974 
deportation hearing Chadha conceded that he was deportable but was 
given leave to file an application for suspension of deportation pursuant 
to Section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
93
 Chadha‘s 
deportation hearing was resumed and eventually the immigration judge 
ordered that his deportation be suspended based on the fact that Chadha 
had met statutory requirements allowing him to remain in the United 
States because he had ―resided continuously in the United States for over 
seven years, was of good moral character, and would suffer ‗extreme 
hardship‘ if deported.‖94 Pursuant to statute, the Attorney General 
reported the suspension of deportation to Congress.
95
 
Upon receiving the Attorney General‘s recommendation for the 
suspension of deportation of immigrants such as Chadha, Congress had 
the right via Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to 
veto the decision of the Attorney General.
96
 On December 12, 1975, 
Congress did just that when Representative Joshua Eilberg (D-PA) 
introduced a motion opposing ―the granting of permanent residence in 
the United States to [six] aliens.‖97 Included in this group, for reasons not 
articulated in the congressional record, was Jagdish Chadha.
98
 The 
resolution was passed without debate or recorded vote.
99
 Neither the 
Senate nor the President was required to take any action on the matter, 
and they did not.
100
 
 
 90. See e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 91. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923 (1983). 
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 93. Id. at 924. 
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Chadha‘s deportation hearings were once again reopened and the 
immigration judge set about enforcing the House‘s veto of the 
suspension of deportation.
101
 Chadha appealed the deportation order in 
front of the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals on 
the grounds that Section 244(c)(2) was an unconstitutional legislative 
veto.
102
 The Board held that it had no power to declare an act of 
Congress unconstitutional and Chadha‘s appeal was dismissed.103 
Chadha then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals where 
he was joined by the INS in his claim that Section 244(c)(2) was 
unconstitutional.
104
 The Ninth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Anthony 
Kennedy, agreed with Chadha and struck down Section 244(c)(2) of the 
Act on the grounds that it constituted a violation of the constitutional 
separation of powers doctrine.
105
 The case was then appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court.
106
 
 
B.  Majority Opinion 
 
Chief Justice Warren Burger issued the Court‘s six-justice majority 
opinion in the Chadha case.
107
 Justice Powell wrote a concurring 
opinion
108
 and Justices White
109
 and Rehnquist
110
 each wrote separate 
dissents. In the majority opinion, Burger affirmed the Ninth Circuit‘s 
ruling and struck down the one-house legislative veto provision 
contained in Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
111
 
Burger‘s opinion was widely panned by many in the legal and scholarly 
community.
112
 It was referred to by one critic as ―wooden, . . . rigid and 
mechanical.‖113 Another called it ―supremely simple‖114 and a third  
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concluded that ―[w]hatever one‘s view about the merits, the Chadha 
opinion is a disappointment.‖115 
Some argued that the Court had decided the case on grounds far 
broader than necessary due to the Court‘s reading of the threshold issues 
involved.
116
 Burger‘s opinion methodically addressed questions of 
jurisdiction,
117
 severability,
118
 standing,
119
 ripeness,
120
 adverseness,
121
 and 
the political question doctrine,
122
 and eventually determined that 
Chadha‘s case was properly before the Supreme Court.123 Having 
disposed of the threshold issues, Burger turned to the constitutional issue 
at hand, the legislative veto. 
Burger‘s reading of the constitutional issues in question was 
criticized by some legal scholars as being too formalistic.
124
 Others 
characterized it as such primarily because it downplayed utilitarian 
arguments related to the ―efficiency‖ of the legislative veto125 and was 
―uncharacteristically economical and direct on the key issue of 
constitutionality.‖126 Regardless, future Justice Stephen Breyer probably 
spoke for many when he concluded that ―[t]he pure constitutional logic 
to which the majority pointed is very difficult to overcome.‖127 
Chief Justice Burger‘s opinion focused on the plain language found 
in Article I governing the legislative process.
128
 Burger first turned to the 
Presentment Clause found in Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution and 
concluded that the action taken by the House when it vetoed Chadha‘s 
suspension of deportation was essentially legislative in nature.
129
 As 
such, the president had a role to play. Burger noted that the Framers 
purposefully included the president in the legislative process as one 
check on the abuse of legislative power.
130
 To have a process that was 
essentially legislative in character exclude any presidential input was a 
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violation of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3.
131
 While Burger conceded that 
not every action taken by the House or Senate need comply with the 
Presentment Clause, he contended that every one that was legislative in 
nature must.
132
 
Legislation must also be passed by majorities in both the Senate and 
the House pursuant to the Bicameralism Clause also found in Article I, 
Section 7.
133
 In Chadha‘s case, only the House voted to veto the 
suspension of deportation.
134
 The Framers, argued the Chief Justice, 
carefully defined specific instances where bicameral procedural 
requirements need not be met, and the procedures in Chadha‘s case were 
not among these clearly articulated exceptions.
135
 Burger concluded that, 
in the absence of these exceptions, legislative actions must be ―exercised 
in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, 
procedure.‖136 Chief Justice Burger downplayed the efficacy of the 
legislative veto as a useful tool for both Congress and the executive 
branch. ―[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, 
and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone‖ he 
opined, ―will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.‖137 
 
C.  Concurring Opinion 
 
Justice Powell concurred with the majority‘s opinion but was 
somewhat cautious about the scope of the majority‘s opinion noting that 
―[t]he breadth of this holding gives one pause.‖138 Powell instead urged 
the Court to decide the case on narrower grounds by making the 
argument that the action taken by the House in Chadha‘s case was 
judicial in nature, not legislative. Congress, Powell argued, did not enact 
a rule but rather made a finding that several people did not comply in this 
instance.
139
 ―It thus undertook the type of decision that traditionally has 
been left to other branches‖ (i.e., the judiciary in this instance).140 Having 
found fault with the actions of Congress on separation of powers 
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grounds, Powell declined to reach the broader questions regarding the 
constitutionality of legislative vetoes generally.
141
 
 
D.  Dissenting Opinions 
 
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist focused primarily on the issue of 
severability. In short, he disagreed with the Court‘s majority that it was 
possible to just sever Section 244(c)(2) while leaving the remainder of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act intact.
142
 Chief Justice Burger had 
disposed with the severability question in short order by noting that the 
Act had a severability clause which gave rise to the presumption that the 
constitutionality of the entire Immigration Act did not turn on the 
invalidity of any particular section of the Act.
143
 ―A provision is further 
presumed severable,‖ wrote Burger ―if what remains after severance ‗is 
fully operative as a law.‘‖144 Severing Section 244(c)(2) would leave the 
remainder of the Act intact.
145
 To Rehnquist the matter was not so cut 
and dried. While conceding that there was an explicit severability clause 
in the Act, Rehnquist instead focused on the Act‘s legislative history in 
reaching the conclusion that ―Congress has never indicated that it would 
be willing to permit suspensions of deportation unless it could retain 
some sort of veto.‖146 Unwilling to sever the potentially offending 
provision or strike down the entire Immigration and Nationality Act, 
Justice Rehnquist was willing to uphold the actions of the House in 
Chadha‘s case and overturn the Ninth Circuit‘s opinion.147 
Justice White‘s dissent focused largely on the functional importance 
of the legislative veto to the political branches of government. ―Today‘s 
decision,‖ he lamented, ―strikes down in one fell swoop provisions in 
more laws enacted by Congress than the Court has cumulatively 
invalidated in its history.‖148 Rather than ruling broadly and seemingly 
striking down all forms and uses of the legislative veto, White argued 
that the Court should give serious deference to the fact that the legislative 
veto was an ―important if not indispensable political invention that 
allows the president and Congress to resolve major constitutional and 
policy differences . . . and preserves Congress‘ control over 
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 144. Id. at 934 (quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm‘n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1015 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 147. Id. at 1014. 
 148. Id. at 1002 (White, J., dissenting). 
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lawmaking.‖149 Without the veto, White argued, Congress was left with a 
Hobson‘s Choice to either refrain from providing Executive Branch 
agencies with needed discretion and flexibility, or to engage in a 
―hopeless‖ task of writing laws with excruciating specificity in order to 
cover every possible contingency.
150
 Neither was desirable nor, in 
White‘s mind, feasible.151 
Justice White responded to Burger‘s Presentment Clause arguments 
by contending that legislative vetoes complied with the spirit of Article I, 
Section 7.
152
 Bills containing legislative vetoes complied with the 
Bicameral and Presentment Clause provisions.
153
 They were passed by 
majorities in both houses and signed by the President.
154
 Exercising a 
legislative veto did not enact new policy in violation of the Presentment 
Clause but rather only ―negated‖ a particular executive branch action.155 
White also contended that legislative vetoes were an acceptable way for 
Congress to delegate power.
156
 Congress regularly delegates lawmaking 
power to executive agencies, White reasoned.
157
 It would therefore seem 
perfectly logical and acceptable to reserve a check (i.e., veto) on such 
delegations.
158
 
Finally, Justice White also took issue with the majority‘s 
characterization of separation of powers. He argued that the Separation 
of Powers Doctrine had previously only led the judiciary to invalidate a 
particular government action when an express provision of the 
Constitution was violated.
159
 The Court should not infer disapproval of 
the legislative veto just because the Framers did not put it in the 
Constitution.
160
 In this circumstance, neither the executive nor the 
judiciary is prevented from carrying out their assigned constitutional 
functions.
161
 Indeed, White noted, the Constitution provides for no 
explicit executive or judicial roles in the deportation process.
162
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In the end, the Ninth Circuit‘s opinion that struck down Section 
244(c)(2) was upheld by the Supreme Court by a 7-2 margin.
163
 Soon 
after the Chadha decision the Court struck down both one-house and a 
two-house legislative veto provisions in Process Gas Consumers Group 
v. Consumer Energy Council.
164
 The message appeared to be sent: The 
legislative veto was dead. 
 
V.  EXECUTIVE BRANCH RESPONSES TO CHADHA 
 
While in a strictly organizational sense both Congress and the 
executive branch are not in a hierarchically subordinate position to the 
Supreme Court, they are expected to carry out Court decisions. To what 
degree can organizational theory be applied to the Chadha case? We now 
turn to an examination of executive branch responses to seek an answer 
to this question. 
While presidential attitudes towards the legislative veto have been 
described as ambivalent, all have criticized and questioned its use.
165
 
Every Attorney General since the Hoover Administration‘s William 
Mitchell has opposed the legislative veto.
166
 At the same time, presidents 
have continued to sign bills into law that contain legislative vetoes.
167
 
Public objections to the legislative veto begin to appear during the 
Eisenhower Administration. It was during this period of time that 
Congress began to increasingly use committee vetoes and ―no 
appropriation‖ provisions in certain legislative areas.168 Eisenhower 
himself had serious doubts about the constitutionality of the idea that 
Congress could delegate a power to one of its committees that, in effect, 
would give it the ability to prevent an executive action that had been 
carried out pursuant to law.
169
 Eisenhower clashed with Congress over 
the inclusion of committee vetoes in legislation such as the Military 
Construction Act of 1951.
170
 Upon seeing a draft of the legislation, 
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Eisenhower sought to repeal these committee vetoes.
171
 When he was 
unsuccessful, he threatened to order the Defense Department to ignore 
them.
172
 Congress abruptly changed its course, replacing the committee 
vetoes with report-and-wait provisions.
173
 
A second example of this conflict came in response to the 1954 
Camp Blanding Bill.
174
 This bill, in part, authorized the transfer of Camp 
Blanding from the United States Army to the state of Florida.
175
 The 
transfer of this and other pieces of real estate were subject to a committee 
veto.
176
 Eisenhower‘s objections to this arrangement were forceful 
enough that he vetoed the entire bill.
177
 Even when Eisenhower signed 
legislation into law that contained vetoes, he noted his objections. 
Eisenhower‘s signing statement for the Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act for 1956 contained a declaration detailing his 
objections to the legislative vetoes in the bill and his intention to treat 
them as invalid, absent instructions from the courts to do otherwise.
178
 
There were fewer public objections to the use of vetoes during the 
Kennedy Administration.
179
 In fact, Kennedy routinely signed legislation 
containing ―no appropriation‖ provisions while in office.180 Far more 
common were presidential vetoes for bills containing legislative vetoes 
or signing statements objecting to their inclusion in bills.
181
 This was the 
general approach to the legislative veto taken by the Kennedy, Johnson, 
Nixon and Ford Administrations.
182
 A prime example of this is the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1964.
183
 The bill 
contained committee vetoes over certain foreign currency transactions. 
President Johnson signed the bill but strongly noted his reservations 
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about the constitutionality of the veto provisions in his accompanying 
signing statement.
184
 
The fight over the legislative veto appeared to be coming to a head 
during the Carter Administration. In a June 21, 1978 statement to 
Congress, Carter declared: ―Pending a decision by the Supreme Court, it 
is my view . . . that these legislative vetoes are unconstitutional . . . . The 
inclusion of such a provision in a bill will be an important factor in my 
decision to sign or to veto it.‖185 When Carter‘s Attorney General held a 
press conference after this announcement, reporters focused on the 
potential conflict between the two branches as opposed to the role of the 
legislative veto in regulatory matters.
186
 Carter got his answer quickly. 
Within ten days Congress once again began to pass bills containing 
legislative vetoes.
187
 
In an interesting twist, Governor Ronald Reagan, running for the 
presidency, supported the legislative veto during the 1980 campaign as a 
tool to curb regulatory excesses.
188
 As a result, there was limited support 
for the legislative veto in the White House at the outset of the Reagan 
Administration.
189
 Nevertheless, Reagan Administration officials quickly 
changed their tune when it became ―their‖ executive branch and the 
legislative veto became a tool that Congress used to ―meddle‖ in 
executive branch affairs.
190
 
The Supreme Court handed down the Chadha decision towards the 
end of Reagan‘s first term in office, a term in which he experienced a 
good deal of legislative success.
191
 One might initially think that the 
Chadha decision was a great victory for the executive branch, but most 
officials quickly realized that it was going to be of little practical 
value.
192
 The chair of the White House policy council explained that 
judging from initial congressional reactions, ―[i]t was already clear that 
we had nothing to gain from trying to find ways of using Chadha to alter 
inter-branch relations under any of these statutes, so we just agreed that 
those tainted legislative vetoes were no longer operable but that the rest 
of the statute remained unaffected.‖193 Without statutory legislative 
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vetoes to govern the delegation of administrative discretion some 
observers, such as Louis Fisher, argued that informal, less public, means 
would be used to achieve the same end: congressional oversight control 
over executive agencies.
194
 
Though part of the executive branch of government, executive 
agencies have very different constraints on their daily activities than do 
the president and top executive branch officials.
195
 As just noted, 
presidents consistently decried the use of the legislative veto, and this 
rhetoric often contained the ―tough talk‖ that presidents felt they needed 
to issue in defense of their presidential prerogatives vis-à-vis 
Congress.
196
 Executive agencies must be more practical in both word and 
deed when dealing with Congress and congressional committees.
197
 
Consequently, their approach to the Chadha decision was a more 
conciliatory one.
198
 
Despite the apparent victory handed to them in the Chadha decision, 
executive agency officials did not rush to insist on strict compliance with 
the Supreme Court‘s decision. The Reagan White House drafted a memo 
instructing all executive agency heads to avoid unnecessary 
confrontation with Congress over the legislative veto.
199
 Many agency 
heads met with powerful committee chairmen to assure them that they 
would try no ―tricks‖ and that business would be conducted largely as 
before, as long as they could maintain their existing level of agency 
autonomy.
200
 Initial post-Chadha testimony in congressional hearings 
again revealed that the administration was not looking for a fight over the 
legislative veto.
201
 Before the House Subcommittee on Administrative 
Law, Deputy Attorney General Edward Schmultz maintained ―as 
strongly as possible‖ that the executive branch would continue ―to 
observe scrupulously the ‗reporting‘ and ‗waiting‘ features that are 
central to virtually all existing legislative veto devices.‖202 He stressed 
that the executive branch wanted to respond to the Chadha decision with 
a ―spirit of comity and mutual respect.‖203 
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One notable, yet brief, exception occurred when Office of 
Management and Budget Director Jim Miller announced shortly after the 
Chadha decision that executive agencies would follow the Supreme 
Court‘s lead and employ the Court‘s reasoning in Chadha. Miller sent a 
memo to all agency heads advising them that they would no longer be 
bound by the traditional committee reports used to ―guide‖ agency 
spending since they, like the legislative veto, were neither laws nor 
signed by the President.
204
 When Congress threatened to tie the 
administration‘s hands with even stricter budgetary controls via other 
means, Miller quickly rescinded his earlier statement.
205
 
Acceptance to the legislative veto was so ingrained in the executive 
branch that it appeared likely to accept vetoes even after the Chadha 
decision.
206
 Some scholars pointed out that the equivalent of the 
legislative veto would still be found in many agency manuals.
207
 Beyond 
the desire to maintain a ―business as usual‖ approach to the relationship 
between the executive and legislative branches, both sides realized that 
absent the legislative veto Congress still retained a variety of oversight 
tools, both formal and informal, that were useful for monitoring the 
activity of executive agencies.
208
 One unnamed Federal Trade 
Commission official lamented that Congress still had ―27 different ways 
of torture.‖209 Recognition of this fact resulted in an environment where 
executive agencies continued to keep Congress informed of their 
activities, even when not explicitly required to, in an effort to maintain a 
good working relationship between the two branches.
210
 
Critics of the Chadha decision pointed to the beneficial ―rules of the 
game‖ that the legislative veto brought to the policymaking process.211 
Congress was willing to give a fair amount of discretion to the executive 
branch but only if it could retain a final say over the implementation of 
policy through the legislative veto.
212
 The executive branch received 
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much needed and desired discretion. This allowed agencies a great deal 
of freedom to operate without continually having to return to Congress to 
ask for congressional approval. In turn, Congress reserved the right 
through the veto to rein in any agency that deviated from congressional 
intent. It is this delicate arrangement that the Court upset causing both 
the executive and legislative branches to seek ways to avoid lawmaking 
via the Court‘s formalistic Chadha framework.213 
As noted above, all presidents voiced their objections to the 
legislative veto in a number of ways even while signing bills containing 
vetoes into law.
214
 This trend continued after the Chadha decision with 
the form changing little. President George H.W. Bush‘s signing 
statement accompanying the Department of Interior‘s Appropriations 
Bill for 1991 read as follows: 
 
Several provisions of H.R. 5769 purport to condition my authority, and 
the authority of affected Executive Branch officials, to use funds 
otherwise appropriated by the Act on the approval of various 
committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate. These 
provisions constitute legislative veto devices of the kind declared 
unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Accordingly, I 
will treat them as having no legal force or effect in this or any other 
legislation in which they appear. I direct agencies confronted with these 
devices to consult with the Attorney General to determine whether the 
grant of authority in question is severable from the unconstitutional 
condition. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684–87 
(1987).
215
 
 
Similarly, in signing the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1990 
President Bush remarked that the committee vetoes contained therein 
would in no way condition his future actions.
216
 For all the rhetoric of the 
signing statements, the daily cooperation between executive branch 
agencies and congressional committees continued unabated. These types 
of statements often served as little more than a reminder that the Chief 
Executive retained certain constitutional options should he wish to 
exercise them. 
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How do policymaking relationships governed by the legislative veto, 
and the initial response of the Reagan Administration, illustrate executive 
branch reaction to the Supreme Court‘s Chadha decision? The Court‘s 
decision certainly seemed to disrupt the ―normal‖ course of business and 
the relationship between executive agencies and Congress. Many 
executive officials viewed the alternative (a veto-less system) with 
suspicion and distrust.
217
 Congress was quick to remind them that it had 
not only other oversight powers, but powers that could make life more 
difficult for executive agencies.
218
 When viewed in this light it seems 
reasonable that agency officials preferred the veto arrangements in place 
before the Court‘s decision over an uncertain, veto-less playing field. 
Agencies and officials that tried to take advantage of the Court‘s decision 
found themselves bound by alternative oversight methods.
219
 To the 
degree that they wanted to retain their autonomy and discretion, they 
continued to interact with Congress as though vetoes, if not 
constitutional, were still understood to be part of the policymaking 
equation. It is this relationship with Congress that is a key component of 
the executive branch reaction to the Court‘s decision. 
We see then that both presidents and agency officials generally 
opposed the veto but acquiesced to its use.
220
 The executive branch had 
come to rely on the legislative veto for its discretion and, knowing that 
Congress had other oversight tools in its arsenal, had no desire to press 
the veto issue. In the next section, we will examine how Congress 
responded to the Court‘s decision by scrutinizing the individual and 
institutional reactions of Congress and its members. 
 
VI.  CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES TO CHADHA 
 
How did Congress respond to the Supreme Court‘s Chadha 
decision? Why did it continue to pass legislative vetoes even after these 
types of vetoes had been declared unconstitutional? This section will 
explore the hypothesis that members of Congress had their own 
preferences that guided their behavior and lead them to continue to pass 
legislative vetoes. 
Initial congressional reaction to Chadha was anything but favorable. 
Immediately following the decision, member after member went to the 
floor of each chamber to denounce the Court‘s actions and outline ways 
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to recapture power. Iowa Senator Charles Grassley defiantly claimed: 
―When Congress is through, executive branch powers will be curtailed 
and the nation will be left with a more cumbersome, less responsive 
government.‖221 Legislative responses were almost instantaneous. 
Seventeen committee chairmen petitioned the Rules Committee to 
develop an institutional response to the Court‘s decision222 and a number 
of hearings in both houses addressed the subject.
223
 
Some reform approaches called for a joint resolution of approval for 
all major regulations.
224
 A House proposal introduced by Trent Lott (R-
MS) called for a joint resolution of approval for major rules and a joint 
resolution of disapproval for minor rules with provisions to make 
changes in House rules to expedite consideration of regulatory rules.
225
 
His House colleague Elliott Levitas (D-GA) proposed a blanket generic 
veto that would be placed in all legislation that delegated power to 
executive agencies, an approach favored by a number of congressmen.
226
 
A constitutional amendment was even drafted to overturn the Court‘s 
decision.
227
 Some measures provided for report-and-wait provisions.
228
 A 
report-and-wait provision simply requires that administrative agencies 
report proposed rules to Congress before implementing them
229
. Report-
and-wait provisions differ from legislative vetoes because Congress must 
pass new legislation and present it to the President for his signature if it 
wishes to block an agency rule.
230
 The Chadha Court went to great 
lengths to stress that report-and-wait provisions were constitutional.
231
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When the dust settled none of these provisions had the support of a 
congressional majority and Congress took no comprehensive approach in 
responding to the Chadha decision.
232
 Those critical of using joint 
resolutions worried about the possibility that Congress would need a 
supermajority to override a presidential veto. The use of joint resolutions 
to monitor executive agency rulemaking also had the potential to get 
Congress bogged down in administrative minutiae.
233
 Generic veto 
proposals languished as well, with the result being ―very much talk, very 
little action.‖234 
There were a number of outspoken critics of the Court‘s decision in 
both houses of Congress. Elliott Levitas, a staunch supporter of the 
legislative veto and a firm believer that the Court had just produced a 
―train-wreck in government,‖ voiced the thoughts of many when he 
boldly declared: ―I firmly believe . . . Justice White‘s dissent will 
become the law of the land.‖235 Rules Committee Chairman Claude 
Pepper (D-FL) agreed with Levitas and took things one step further 
arguing that Congress should continue to force legislative veto-type 
cases in an effort to force the Supreme Court to further specify the 
bounds of Chadha or revisit the issue and chip away at the Chadha 
opinion.
236
 He even held out hope that a change in Court personnel 
would save future veto provisions.
237
 
Trying to work around the Supreme Court‘s Chadha decision was 
one thing, but open defiance (the continued passing of legislative vetoes) 
was another. This defiance worried some observers. Richard Paschal 
voiced the concerns of many when he stated: ―Nevertheless, while it is 
appropriate to allow the Court a second look at legislation it has 
previously invalidated, it may not be suitable to pass similar laws if they 
are repeatedly struck down as unconstitutional by the Court.‖238 In noting 
the continuing tide of legislative vetoes after the Chadha decision, one 
scholar concluded: ―[The Supreme Court‘s] decision will be eroded by 
open defiance and subtle evasion.‖239 
Compliance with the Chadha decision was not completely absent, 
however. Congress amended some statutes by deleting legislative veto 
provisions from them and replacing them with joint resolutions.
240
 In 
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other cases legislative vetoes remained but went unused.
241
 Some 
legislative vetoes were converted into informal understandings that gave 
committees effective oversight control over agencies.
242
 
As noted earlier, there was a spate of legislation introduced in both 
chambers designed to respond to Chadha.
243
 None passed. Why? There 
are several explanations. One reason is that support for the legislative 
veto in Congress was far from unanimous. Anthony Beilenson (D-CA) 
voiced the opinion of many when he claimed, ―I haven‘t been all that 
upset by the Chadha decision. I never thought that the veto was all that 
useful.‖244 Similarly, Representative Joseph Moakley (D-MA) 
concluded: ―[T]he decision should not be viewed as a disaster or as a 
victory for anyone.‖245 
A second reason was that the majority of the leadership in both 
houses supported only limited use of the legislative veto to help 
Congress deal with certain troublesome issues, and they did not view it 
as a useful tool for everyday oversight.
246
 House Minority Leader Bob 
Michel (R-IL) described the legislative veto as ―kind of a cop-out,‖ a 
way for Congress to defer making decisions on controversial topics.
247
 
The Speaker of the House, Tip O‘Neill (D-MA), was described as a 
―longtime foe‖ of the legislative veto.248 The leadership was cautious in 
its reaction to Chadha. It did not want to rush headlong into anything 
without first being sure about the ramifications for congressional 
oversight. 
While many focus on the continued presence of legislative vetoes in 
statutes following the Chadha decision, perhaps the focus properly lies 
elsewhere. It is clear that Congress continued to pass legislative vetoes in 
defiance of the Court‘s decision.249 Yet at the same time, Congress made 
some token efforts to modify existing veto provisions and strike 
others.
250
 The loss of the veto prompted some scholars to fear that inter-
branch conflict would become both more prevalent and more public. 
Martha Liebler Gibson argued that the legislative veto often prompted 
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Congress and agencies to informally negotiate issues to an amiable 
solution.
251
 Without the veto, she feared more frequent and more public 
confrontations between the two branches.
252
 Most scholars, however, 
feared just the opposite. As Louis Fisher has argued, what Chadha may 
have done is make lawmaking ―more convoluted, cumbersome, and 
covert than before,‖ driving underground legislative vetoes that were 
formerly in plain sight.
253
 House Counsel Stanley Brand quipped: ―We‘re 
about to get ‗veto by telephone.‘ Committee chairmen will call the 
agencies and tell them what to do.‖254 It is precisely these ―informal 
arrangements‖ with executive agencies that gave some degree of comfort 
to those in Congress who lamented the loss of the legislative veto.
255
 
Clarence Long (D-MD) noted that congressional means of oversight 
consisting mainly of informal, inter-branch contacts had not really been 
affected by the decision.
256
 Collectively, these informal pressures might 
very well amount to legislative veto authority (or better).
257
 
Representative Joe Moakley‘s (D-MA) words are telling: ―The system is 
clearly not sanctioned by the Chadha decision, but that doesn‘t matter 
because the system is beyond the reach of the courts as long as both 
branches operate in good faith.‖258 As long as Congress and the executive 
dealt in good faith they could continue to make and execute policy in a 
manner which both appeared to prefer, notwithstanding the Court‘s 
formalistic view of separation of powers enunciated in Chadha.
259
 
If informal arrangements often accomplished the same purpose as the 
legislative veto, why did Congress continue to pass them? The presence 
of many of these veto provisions in legislation had become so common 
that they were often considered a boilerplate matter.
260
 They were just 
routinely inserted without much thought being given to their presence. 
House Legal Counsel Steven Ross explained initial post-Chadha vetoes 
by saying, ―Each bill isn‘t gone over with a fine-tooth comb to compare 
it to what the Supreme Court said in Chadha.‖261 Justice Department 
Legal Counsel Ted Olson concurred: ―It was probably not intentional to 
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include legislative vetoes or expect them to be enforced. The legislation 
might have been so far in the pipeline that people didn‘t catch them.‖262 
House Counsel Stanly Brand agreed with his Justice Department 
counterpart when he reminded everyone that the process of adjusting to 
the Chadha decision was ―like the Queen Mary . . . [y]ou can‘t turn it 
around that quickly.‖263 
Others were less sanguine about giving Congress the benefit of the 
doubt. In fact, one House Appropriations Committee staffer indicated 
that the post-Chadha inclusion of legislative vetoes was not accidental 
and that they would continue to be inserted until they were specifically 
challenged in the courts.
264
 Having witnessed the continuing presence of 
legislative vetoes through 1986, Michael Horan claims: 
 
The continued appearance of these unconstitutional vetoes is not easy 
to explain. Related committee reports make no effort to defend their 
legality, and there is little or no floor discussion of the vetoes. What 
might have been shrugged off as mere carelessness in legislative 
draftsmanship cannot now be viewed as anything other than intentional 
in light of the persistent (though occasional) use of these committee 
vetoes, their number, and the fact that repeated calls by the President 
for their elimination have gone unheeded.
265
 
 
It appears that many in Congress were opposed to the Supreme 
Court‘s decision.266 Others realized that informal oversight measures 
would serve essentially the same purpose as the legislative veto.
267
 Either 
way, it is apparent that many members of Congress preferred the veto or 
its equivalent as an oversight tool when dealing with the executive 
branch. Many argued that the legislative veto was an invaluable means of 
oversight for Congress, necessitated by the rise of the federal 
bureaucracy.
268
 It was a vital tool that Congress could use when 
traditional oversight methods failed.
269
 
Louis Fisher claims that the Supreme Court never really understood 
why Congress and the executive branch wanted the veto in the first 
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place, thereby underestimating the full repercussions of its decision.
270
 
Scholars Jacob Javits and Gary Klein referred to the legislative veto as 
the ―most efficacious‖ congressional oversight method, arguing that it 
had ―unparalleled utility.‖271 It was also certainly used with enough 
frequency that it can be said many members of Congress saw it as a way 
of fulfilling many of their oversight and policymaking needs.
272
 Strom 
Thurmond‘s statement at congressional hearings following the decision 
illustrated this point when he concluded: ―The veto was seen as an 
effective means of controlling the constantly expanding regulatory 
authority of agencies and a necessary mechanism.‖273 
Stephen Breyer viewed the regulatory veto as one method of 
compromise between political accountability and the necessary 
complexity that is involved in regulatory decision-making.
274
 Viewed in 
this light, the veto was a tool that Congress could use to maintain its 
constitutional prerogatives vis-à-vis the other branches of government in 
a changing political system.
275
 Martha Gibson astutely summed up this 
position: 
 
At best the legislative veto was an eminently logical accommodation to 
the complexities of modern government—precisely the kind of 
adaptation which the Founders had in mind when they designed our 
government. At worst it was a facilitator of legislative irresponsibility, 
a means to transfer the duties of elected representatives to . . . unelected 
administrators.
276
 
 
She went on to explain that the legislative veto could allow Congress to 
avoid the responsibility of legislating in politically sensitive areas by 
delegating authority to the executive branch, and then claiming credit by 
killing unpopular agency initiatives without having to offer any concrete 
alternatives in return.
277
 To the degree that this is an accurate assessment 
of the potential value of the legislative veto, it is little wonder that 
members sought to retain it. 
Some scholars concede that the legislative veto was a powerful 
symbolic tool but argue that ―acknowledging that the legislative veto was 
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a powerful symbol of congressional control is a far cry from establishing 
the mechanism‘s indispensability.‖278 Others, like future Supreme Court 
Justice Antonin Scalia, saw it as ―a solution in search of a problem;‖ it 
did not really deal effectively with the problems surrounding the 
delegation of congressional power and agency rulemaking.
279
 In his 
testimony before the House Rules Committee, Morris Ogul concurred, 
stating that the legislative veto was ―not quantitatively and probably not 
qualitatively central to the legislative efforts to oversee the 
bureaucracy.‖280 
Joel Aberbach‘s study of the legislative veto in Keeping a Watchful 
Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight supports the contention 
that the legislative veto was not the invaluable oversight tool that many 
claimed.
281
 Of the fourteen oversight techniques examined by Aberbach, 
the legislative veto ranked dead last in terms of use.
282
 Indeed, only 2.4% 
of the staffers he surveyed reported using the legislative veto frequently 
or very frequently.
283
 His results also revealed that the legislative veto 
was only the ninth (out of fourteen) most effective oversight tool 
employed by those in the 95th Congress.
284
 These results lead Aberbach 
to postulate that the reasons the legislative veto scored so poorly as an 
oversight tool was that there were many more informal, and effective, 
ways of accomplishing congressional oversight goals.
285
 Whether 
symbolic or practical, the legislative veto certainly became a favorite tool 
of many members of Congress. This is despite the many questions from 
the outset regarding its constitutionality and utility. Regardless, the 
veto‘s powerful appeal certainly indicates a preference by many in 
Congress not to give up that particular tool without a fight. 
 
VII.  THE TREASURY ACT OF 1992: POST-CHADHA POLICYMAKING IN 
ACTION 
 
The Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government 
Appropriations Act of 1992 provides an instructive look at the ways in 
which legislative vetoes continued to be used long after the Chadha 
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decision.
286
 With Republican George H.W. Bush as President and a 
Democratic-controlled Congress, the budget sessions of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s were often tumultuous.
287
 Even without divided 
government, the budget process is often one where Congress seeks as 
much control over how money is spent by the executive branch as it can 
get. The budget process of 1992 has been described by some as relatively 
―calm,‖ but there is still evidence that Congress sought to flex its 
muscles through the appropriations process.
288
 
The Treasury Act of 1992 contained a number of legislative 
vetoes.
289
 These vetoes were committee vetoes.
290
 The following 
provision regarding the administration of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
funds is illustrative: 
 
Section 1. Not to exceed 4 per centum of any appropriation made 
available to the Internal Revenue Service for the current fiscal year by 
this Act may be transferred to any other Internal Revenue Service 
appropriation upon advance approval of the House and Senate 
Committees on Appropriations.
291
 
 
The shifting of funds by an executive agency, often called 
reprogramming, from one program to another has historically been 
arranged informally between Congress and agencies, but in recent years 
Congress has increasingly written vetoes such as the one above into 
appropriations legislation.
292
 
Other committee vetoes included limits on the amount of funds 
transferred between programs in the General Services Administration, 
limits on the amount that presidential appointees could spend on 
redecorating their offices without advance approval of the 
Appropriations Committees, and requirements that facility maintenance 
for certain federal buildings be approved in advance by the 
Appropriations Committees.
293
 These types of vetoes attempted to codify 
Appropriations Committee reports, which are increasingly used to 
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micromanage the spending authority of executive branch agencies.
294
 In 
discussing this process, Allen Schick notes that these committee reports 
are often not binding legally, but the reality is that few agencies want to 
cross Congress and ignore these reports.
295
 
The appropriateness of such veto provisions was, in an unusual 
move, protested on the floor of the House during the debate of H.R. 
2622. Representative James Traficant (D-OH), unhappy that an 
amendment of his was stripped from the bill, raised dozens of 
parliamentary objections to provisions in the Appropriations bill that 
caused debate to drag on for hours.
296
 Representative Traficant noted that 
a significant portion of the bill (including the legislative veto 
provisions—though he didn‘t mention these by name) conditioned 
funding for programs or agencies on certain Executive (in)actions. 
297
He 
successfully argued that this amounted to putting legislation in an 
appropriations bill in violation of House rules.
298
 
Traficant‘s actions eventually turned out to be a quixotic attempt to 
buck the desires of congressional leadership. Allen Schick‘s discussion 
of the budget process notes that such conditional spending directions in 
Appropriations bills, while probably not appropriate, will likely remain 
there when the leadership desires it.
299
 In this case, they did, and all the 
language stricken from the bill on the floor of the House reappeared in 
the House-Senate conference committee report on the bill.
300
 The 
Treasury Act of 1992 passed the House and the Senate on a voice vote in 
each chamber on October 3, 1991.
301
 The veto provisions had been 
restored in their entirety without a single word being mentioned about 
their presence in any of the debate on the bill.
302
 
Predictably, President Bush commented on these veto provisions 
when he signed the bill into law on October 28, 1991. He wrote: 
 
A number of provisions in the Act condition the President‘s authority, 
and the authority of affected executive branch officials, to use funds 
otherwise appropriated by this Act on the approval of various 
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committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate. These 
provisions constitute legislative vetoes similar to those declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha. 
Accordingly, I will treat them as having no legal force or effect in this 
or any other legislation in which they appear.
303
 
 
In essence, the ―dance‖ was complete. Congress used the vetoes to 
condition executive branch spending. The President noted that they could 
not legally do this. Despite the President‘s proclamation, executive 
agencies surely took note of the congressional ―recommendations.‖304 
The manner in which these vetoes were included surely indicates that the 
congressional leadership placed a value on them. In an era of divided and 
occasionally acrimonious government, the limits on presidential 
appointee office redecoration were probably just an inter-branch dig at 
the other party. As noted earlier, there was no public discussion of these 
veto provisions. Their presence and the fact that they were incorporated 
into Appropriations bills would apparently reflect Congress‘ desire to 
keep a very close eye on certain executive branch activities. 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
A number of political and legal scholars have used organizational 
theory to explain the implementation and impact of judicial decisions. 
One of the hypotheses often put forward is that agencies responsible for 
the implementation of judicial policies often have organizational 
preferences of their own that outweigh their motivations to comply with 
court decisions.
305
 This article has applied the above hypothesis to the 
Supreme Court‘s decision to strike down the legislative veto in INS v. 
Chadha. There is some evidence to support that conclusion when 
analyzing executive agency response to the Court‘s Chadha decision. On 
its face, the executive branch was handed what appeared to be a victory 
from which it would vigorously seek to gain advantage.
306
 This did not 
turn out to be the case as agencies continued to acquiesce both to 
congressional passage of legislative vetoes and informal veto-like 
arrangements.
307
 To do so was the price for their precious, and preferred, 
autonomy. Although we are looking at separate, co-equal branches of 
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government, these agencies, at least in theory, appeared bound to 
implement the Court‘s decision. Our examination supports the contention 
that they were complicit in a failure to do so. They preferred the ―old‖ 
pre-Chadha system and took actions (or failed to act) in order to preserve 
it.
308
 
Congress was also responsible for implementing the Court‘s 
decision, yet it continued to pass legislative vetoes.
309
 Again, we have 
seen where many members apparently found the legislative veto to be an 
indispensable tool for Congress in the oversight of executive agencies.
310
 
Others, including congressional leaders, were less inclined to rush into a 
comprehensive response to Chadha. They quickly reminded executive 
branch officials that other formal and informal oversight methods 
remained and that Chadha would result in no functional change in the 
relationship between the two branches.
311
 Congress would continue to 
pass vetoes and retain the functional equivalent in areas where vetoes 
were modified or deleted. It too preferred the ―old‖ system and resisted 
implementation of the decision in a variety of subtle and not so subtle 
ways as the Treasury Act of 1992 illustrates. 
The findings in this particular case appear to support the theory that 
courts may have difficulty in gaining compliance with their decisions 
when those responsible for implementing them have preferences that 
clearly differ from those of the court. In this case we see an unpopular 
Supreme Court decision and responses by both Congress and the 
executive branch reflecting their desire to retain the old status quo. 
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